Property Classification Legal Insights

can this case help in establishing dwelling-house argument

is not a dwelling in the * act

can the case help my witness statement, if yes please write the relevant description so i may include it in the witness statement: **WITNESS STATEMENT OF GARY JOHN TAYLOR** *. **Introduction**: - I, Gary John Taylor, of The Moorings, High Street, Barnby Dun, Doncaster, DN3 1DY, make this Statement of Claim Against The City of Doncaster Council and Its Representatives: Scot Robert Fawcus, Miss Emily Lewin, Alan Stoves, and Damian Francis Allen (in their personal capacities). *. **Core Issues**: - Unlawful Interim Charging Order - Procedural Breaches - Discrimination - Void Orders - Misrepresentation of LGFA * *. **Dwelling-House Definition and Classification**: - A "Dwelling-House" is a legally recognized home with essential living facilities. This classification provides legal protections that the council's charging order disregards. The cases *Uratemp Ventures Ltd v. Collins [*] UKHL ** (ExhibitGJT1) and *R (on the application of Wilson) v. Coventry City Council [*] EWHC * (Admin)* (ExhibitGJT2) highlight this importance, further safeguarded under *Halsbury's Laws of England*. *. **Events and Personal Impact**: - On * November *, I was distressed to receive a notification regarding an interim charging order, retroactively dated * October *, issued by the council. This order was based on a bulk liability list included in a letter sent on * October *. - I reject the Claimant's unlawful attempt to impose a charging order on my personal residence formally classified as a “Dwelling-House” under *Halsbury's Laws*, providing it with significant legal protections differing from the term "dwelling" used in the Local Government Finance Act *. This distinction influences the legitimacy and enforcement of the charging order. *. **Violation of Individual Case Assessment**: - The processing of liability orders without individual court case reference numbers for each defendant undermines the need for individualized judicial scrutiny. This oversight contravenes the legal principles established in *R v. Birmingham Magistrates' Court ex parte Ahmed [*] EWHC Admin ** (ExhibitGJT3). *. **Single Justice Procedure (SJP) Misapplication**: - Utilizing the Single Justice Procedure (SJP) for complex council tax disputes is inappropriate. These cases require detailed judicial scrutiny rather than summary handling under SJP, as highlighted in *R v. Birmingham Magistrates' Court ex parte Ahmed [*] EWHC Admin ** (ExhibitGJT3). *. **Evidence Presented by the Claimant**: - The Claimant's documentation presents a Doncaster Magistrates Court Schedule of liability orders for council tax dated * July * for *,* defendants. Additionally, an impermissible 'liability order report' dated * July * on the reverse side evidences *,* defendants under illegitimate liability orders. The absence of lawful liability court orders and unique case numbers for * defendants across *, *, and * constitutes a severe breach of legal principles. This grave procedural error directly contravenes the established tenets in *R v. Swindon Borough Council ex parte Roberts [*] EWHC Admin ** (ExhibitGJT4). *. **Ramifications for Defendants**: - The mass processing of cases, lacking individual unique court claim identifiers and thorough judicial scrutiny of documents, leads to significant errors and injustices for defendants. This method strips individuals of their right to personalized legal scrutiny and a fair hearing, blatantly violating their legal, lawful, and human rights. *. **Petition for Judicial Review**: - I urge the court to scrutinize the procedural errors and misapplication of the Single Justice Procedure (SJP). Each defendant's case must receive thorough individual evaluation to ensure adherence to legal protocols, equitable treatment, and justice. *. **Dispute Regarding the Liability Order**: - I have made formal requests for detailed substantiating evidence from the Claimants about the alleged debts. To date, these requests remain unaddressed. This deficiency in evidence blatantly contravenes the findings in *Steel v. NRAM Ltd [*] UKSC ** (ExhibitGJT5), which asserts that mere demands do not equate to definitive proof of debt. *. **Lack of Lawful Court Orders**: - The failure to issue lawful liability court orders and unique case numbers for * defendants across *, *, and * represents a severe violation of legal principles. This grave procedural error directly contravenes the established tenets in *R v. Swindon Borough Council ex parte Roberts [*] EWHC Admin ** (ExhibitGJT4). *. **Violation of the Human Rights Act ***: - The Council's actions constitute a direct infringement of my rights under Article * of the Human Rights Act *, which safeguards an individual’s right to respect for private and family life. *. **Breach of the Disability Discrimination Act ***: - The actions taken by Doncaster Council may represent unlawful discrimination against me based on my health conditions, directly violating the provisions of the Disability Discrimination Act *. This Act mandates reasonable adjustments and unequivocally prohibits unfavourable treatment rooted in disability. Specific instances illustrate the council's failure to accommodate my health conditions, thereby breaching its obligations. *. **Contravention of the Equality Act ***: - **Indirect Discrimination**: The Council's imposition of fines and additional financial burdens disproportionately impacts individuals with disabilities, breaching the principle of equal treatment. - **Neglect of Reasonable Adjustments**: Despite my ongoing health issues that significantly compromise my financial standing, I have persistently made arrears payments when feasible. The Council has failed to adapt their approach or offer necessary support in light of my circumstances, violating their duty to implement reasonable adjustments. - **Harassment**: The Council has systematically targeted me by levying unnecessary costs at every turn over the years, even as I have attempted to resolve these issues amicably. This behaviour cultivates an environment of intimidation and hostility, amounting to harassment. *. **Void Court Orders**: - As stated by **Shirley Lewald**, a Solicitor Advocate with Higher Rights (Civil and Criminal Courts), a court 'ORDER' is void if issued without jurisdiction, in violation of the law, or in defiance of due process. This principle is supported by several case laws: - *Anlaby v. Praetorius* (*): A plaintiff cannot obtain a valid judgment if the proceedings are fundamentally void (ExhibitGJT6). - *Crane v. Director of Public Prosecutions* [*]: An order void ab initio lacks the essential elements of a valid court order (ExhibitGJT7). - *MacFoy v. United Africa Co. Ltd.* [*]: A void order is irrevocably void, rendering all proceedings founded on it void (ExhibitGJT8). *. **Anticipated Rebuttals and Responses**: - **Broad Interpretation**: The council might argue that the term "domestic property" in the * Local Government Finance Act covers all residential properties, including "Dwelling-Houses." However, *Uratemp Ventures Ltd v. Collins [*] UKHL ** (ExhibitGJT1) establishes that "Dwelling-Houses" have a distinct legal status with specific protections. *. **Reassessment of Property Classification in Light of Case Law**: - **Dwelling**: Defined for council tax purposes as properties intended or viable for residential use, as per the Local Government Finance Act * and supported by the ruling in *R (on the application of Wilson) v. Coventry City Council [*] EWHC * (Admin)* (ExhibitGJT2). This classification includes council tax liability based on general residential suitability. - **Dwelling-House**: More narrowly defined as a 'home' equipped for day-to-day living, clarified in *Uratemp Ventures Ltd v. Collins [*] UKHL ** (ExhibitGJT1). The implications influence council tax duties based on actual residential occupancy and available amenities. *. **Violation of the Human Rights Act ***: - The Council's actions constitute a direct infringement of my rights under Article * of the Human Rights Act *, which safeguards an individual’s right to respect for private and family life. - The improper classification of my property disregards my legal protections as a "Dwelling-House," undermining my right to a secure home environment. - The enforcement measures taken without recognizing these protections violate the principles of fairness and justice, further infringing upon my human rights. *. **Breach of the Disability Discrimination Act ***: - Doncaster Council's actions may constitute unlawful discrimination against me due to my health conditions, violating the *Disability Discrimination Act **. - The Act requires reasonable adjustments and prohibits unfavourable treatment based on disability. - Specific instances demonstrate the council's failure to accommodate my health conditions, breaching its legal obligations. *. **Contravention of the Equality Act ***: - **Indirect Discrimination**: The Council's imposition of fines and additional financial burdens disproportionately impacts individuals with disabilities, violating the principle of equal treatment. - **Neglect of Reasonable Adjustments**: Despite my ongoing health issues that significantly compromise my financial standing, I have persistently made arrears payments when feasible. The Council has failed to adapt their approach or offer necessary support in light of my circumstances, violating their duty to implement reasonable adjustments. - **Harassment**: The Council has systematically targeted me by levying unnecessary costs at every turn over the years, even as I have attempted to resolve these issues amicably. This behaviour cultivates an environment of intimidation and hostility, amounting to harassment. *. **Void Court Orders**: - As stated by **Shirley Lewald**, a Solicitor Advocate with Higher Rights (Civil and Criminal Courts), a court 'ORDER' is void if issued without jurisdiction, in violation of the law, or in defiance of due process. This principle is supported by several case laws: - *Anlaby v. Praetorius* (*): A plaintiff cannot obtain a valid judgment if the proceedings are fundamentally void (ExhibitGJT6). - *Crane v. Director of Public Prosecutions* [*]: An order void ab initio lacks the essential elements of a valid court order (ExhibitGJT7). - *MacFoy v. United Africa Co. Ltd.* [*]: A void order is irrevocably void, rendering all proceedings founded on it void (ExhibitGJT8). *. **Anticipated Rebuttals and Responses** - **Broad Interpretation**: The council might argue that the term "domestic property" in the * Local Government Finance Act covers all residential properties, including "Dwelling-Houses." However, *Uratemp Ventures Ltd v. Collins [*] UKHL ** (ExhibitGJT1) establishes that "Dwelling-Houses" have a distinct legal status with specific protections. - **Legislative Intent**: They may claim that the legislative intent behind the Act was to create a uniform approach for all residential properties regarding council tax. This argument overlooks the elevated legal standards and protections mandated for "Dwelling-Houses" under *Halsbury's Laws of England*. - **Case Law Limitation**: The council could argue that case law distinctions apply only in specific contexts and do not universally exempt "Dwelling-Houses" from broader definitions in the Local Government Finance Act. The rulings in *Uratemp Ventures Ltd v. Collins [*] UKHL ** (ExhibitGJT1) and *R (on the application of Wilson) v. Coventry City Council [*] EWHC * (Admin)* (ExhibitGJT2) emphasize the necessity of individual judicial scrutiny and compliance with higher standards for "Dwelling-Houses." - **Procedural Compliance**: They might insist that their actions comply with procedural requirements outlined in the Act, regardless of the "Dwelling-House" classification. However, the failure to adhere to the stringent protocols required for "Dwelling-Houses" renders their actions procedurally deficient. - **Precedent Cases**: The council may present previous cases where similar arguments were unsuccessful, aiming to undermine my position. Nonetheless, the specific legal context and protections highlighted in *Uratemp Ventures Ltd v. Collins [*] UKHL ** (ExhibitGJT1) and *R (on the application of Wilson) v. Coventry City Council [*] EWHC * (Admin)* (ExhibitGJT2) are highly relevant to this case, reaffirming the necessity for adherence to elevated legal standards for "Dwelling-Houses." *. **Reassessment of Property Classification in Light of Case Law**: - **Dwelling**: Defined for council tax purposes as properties intended or viable for residential use, as per the Local Government Finance Act * and supported by the ruling in *R (on the application of Wilson) v. Coventry City Council [*] EWHC * (Admin)* (ExhibitGJT2). This classification includes council tax liability based on general residential suitability. - **Dwelling-House** : More narrowly defined as a 'home' equipped for day-to-day living, clarified in *Uratemp Ventures Ltd v. Collins [*] UKHL ** (ExhibitGJT1). The implications influence council tax duties based on actual residential occupancy and available amenities. *. **Violation of the Human Rights Act ***: - The Council's actions constitute a direct infringement of my rights under Article * of the Human Rights Act *, which safeguards an individual’s right to respect for private and family life. - The improper classification of my property disregards my legal protections as a "Dwelling-House," undermining my right to a secure home environment. - The enforcement measures taken without recognizing these protections violate the principles of fairness and justice, further infringing upon my human rights. *. **Breach of the Disability Discrimination Act ***: - Doncaster Council's actions may constitute unlawful discrimination against me due to my health conditions, violating the *Disability Discrimination Act **. - The Act requires reasonable adjustments and prohibits unfavourable treatment based on disability. - Specific instances demonstrate the council's failure to accommodate my health conditions, breaching its legal obligations. *. **Contravention of the Equality Act ***: - **Indirect Discrimination**: The Council's imposition of fines and additional financial burdens disproportionately impacts individuals with disabilities, violating the principle of equal treatment. - **Neglect of Reasonable Adjustments**: Despite my ongoing health issues that significantly compromise my financial standing, I have persistently made arrears payments when feasible. The Council has failed to adapt their approach or offer necessary support in light of my circumstances, violating their duty to implement reasonable adjustments. - **Harassment**: The Council has systematically targeted me by levying unnecessary costs at every turn over the years, even as I have attempted to resolve these issues amicably. This behaviour cultivates an environment of intimidation and hostility, amounting to harassment. *. **Void Court Orders**: - As stated by **Shirley Lewald**, a Solicitor Advocate with Higher Rights (Civil and Criminal Courts), a court 'ORDER' is void if issued without jurisdiction, in violation of the law, or in defiance of due process. This principle is supported by several case laws *. **Claim for Damages and Remedies**: - I claim substantial remedies and compensation for the significant damages caused by the actions of the City of Doncaster Council and its officials, specifically Scot Robert Fawcus, Miss Emily Lewin, Alan Stoves, and Damian Francis Allen (in their personal capacities). - **Financial Losses**: Compensation for fines and additional costs, totaling approximately £*,*. - **Emotional Distress**: I seek £*,* in compensation for severe emotional distress and mental health impact, reflecting the chronic nature of the distress endured. - **Layman's Fees**: As a litigant in person, I claim reimbursement for layman's services rendered in defending against the interim charging order and extensive correspondence over several years. This is calculated at £* per hour, totaling an estimated £*,*. - **Council Tax Reimbursement**: Full reimbursement of all council tax payments made under the incorrect classification of my property over the past 28 years, projected at £*,*, pending Council confirmation notwithstanding the typical six-year limit. *. **Continual Mistake and Classification Error**: - **Continual Mistake**: Overpayment of council tax due to the continual misclassification of my property as a "Dwelling" rather than a "Dwelling-House" has resulted in incorrect charges for 28 years. - **Legal Precedent**: *Gravesham Borough Council v Secretary of State for the Environment* [*] * P&CR * (ExhibitGJT9) establishes that a "Dwelling-House" includes essential living facilities. My property meets these criteria and should have been classified accordingly. The LGFA * lacks clear provisions for this classification. - **Implication**: The absence of provisions for "Dwelling-House" in the LGFA * makes the council's billing legally questionable, undermining the lawfulness of the charges on my property. - **Legal Uncertainty**: The absence of a clear definition in the LGFA * creates ambiguity, leading to potential misclassification and unlawful charges on my property. - **Judicial Precedent**: *Uratemp Ventures Ltd v. Collins* [*] UKHL * (ExhibitGJT1) emphasizes the legal distinction and protections afforded to properties correctly classified as "Dwelling-Houses." *. **Request for Evidence and Procedural Review**: - **Transparency and Fair Hearing**: Liability orders must be issued in open court to ensure transparency and accountability. Closed hearings ("star chambers") may undermine procedural fairness, violating Article * of the Human Rights Act *. This could result in the invalidation of the orders due to the lack of transparency. *R (on the application of Mackay) v. Newham London Borough Council* [*] EWHC * (Admin) (ExhibitGJT10) highlights the importance of open hearings to uphold procedural fairness. - **Legal Requirements**: The issuance of liability orders must comply with the Local Government Finance Act * and other relevant regulations, proving my property is indeed a 'Dwelling-House,' lawfully liable for council tax under the LGFA *. - **Request for Information**: I request the court to demand: *. Evidence of the venue used for issuing the alleged lawful liability orders. *. Evidence of the documentation laid before the court. *. Evidence of the individual Court, unique case numbers with listings dates. *. Evidence that the Civil Business Centre is a lawful venue to issue an Interim Charging Order. - **Challenge Process**: If closed hearings were used, I challenge the validity of these orders based on the right to a fair and public hearing. *. **Comparative Case Studies**: - **Case *: * *Smith v. Northumberland County Council* [*] EWHC * (Admin)** (ExhibitGJT11): - The court confirmed Smith's property, with essential living facilities, as a 'Dwelling-House,' granting it specific legal protections under housing laws. - **Case *: * *Brown v. Southwark Borough Council* [*] EWCA Civ *** (ExhibitGJT12): - The court ruled in Brown's favour, recognizing the property met 'Dwelling-House' criteria due to essential living facilities, distinguishing it from a general 'dwelling' under the LGFA *. - **Case *: *Taylor v. Leeds City Council* [*] EWCA Civ *** (ExhibitGJT13): - Taylor successfully argued for 'Dwelling-House' classification based on essential living facilities, with the court acknowledging the legal protections of this classification under housing laws. *. **Successful Challenges and Refunds**: -**Case *: *Williams v. Horsham District Council* [*] EWCA Civ *** (ExhibitGJT14): - Williams successfully argued that his property was misclassified, leading to a refund of the overpaid council tax. - **Case *: *Jones v. Liverpool City Council* [*] EWHC * (Admin)** (ExhibitGJT15): - Jones received a council tax refund after proving that his property was incorrectly classified as a 'dwelling' rather than a 'Dwelling-House'. - **Case *: *Smith v. Northumberland County Council* [*] EWHC * (Admin)** (ExhibitGJT11): - Smith received a full refund of council tax payments due to incorrect property classification. *. **Conclusion**: - Given the multitude of procedural violations, discriminatory practices, breaches of the Equality Act *, improper application of the Single Justice Procedure, the presence of unlawfully issued liability orders from bulk listings, and the unjust issuance of the interim charging order by the Civil National Business Centre, I respectfully implore the court to: - Nullify the interim charging order. - Reimburse legal expenses and council tax payments. - Acknowledge and rectify procedural violations and instances of harassment. - Provide adequate compensation for financial losses and emotional distress caused. **List of Exhibits & Descriptions** *. **Exhibit-GJT1: Uratemp Ventures Ltd v. Collins [*] UKHL *** - Description: Legal case establishing the distinct legal status and protections for "Dwelling-Houses". https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200102/ldjudgmt/jd011011/uratem-*.htm *. **Exhibit-GJT2: (R on the application of Wilson v. Coventry City Council [*] EWHC * (Admin)** - Description: Case emphasizing the importance of individual judicial scrutiny and compliance with higher standards for "Dwelling-Houses". https://vlex.co.uk/vid/r-wilson-and-others-* *. **Exhibit-GJT3: R v. Birmingham Magistrates' Court ex parte Ahmed [*] EWHC Admin *** - Description: Case highlighting the necessity of individualized judicial scrutiny in the processing of liability orders. https://vlex.co.uk/vid/r-v-the-birmingham-* *. **Exhibit-GJT4: R v. Swindon Borough Council ex parte Roberts [*] EWHC Admin *** - Description: Case emphasizing the requirement for lawful liability court orders with unique case numbers. *. **Exhibit-GJT5: Steel v. NRAM Ltd [*] UKSC *** - Description: Case asserting that mere demands do not equate to definitive proof of debt. https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/docs/uksc-*-*-judgment.pdf *. **Exhibit-GJT6: Anlaby v. Praetorius (*)** - Description: Principle that a plaintiff cannot obtain a valid judgment if the proceedings are fundamentally void. https://www.iclr.co.uk/document/*/casereport_45719/html *. **Exhibit-GJT7: Crane v. Director of Public Prosecutions [*]** - Description: Case establishing that an order void ab initio lacks the essential elements of a valid court order. https://www.coursehero.com/file/*/Crane-v-Director-of-Public-Prosecutions-1921rtf/ *. **Exhibit-GJT8: MacFoy v. United Africa Co. Ltd. [*]** - Description: Case asserting that a void order is irrevocably void, rendering all proceedings founded on it void. https://vlex.co.uk/vid/macfoy-v-united-africa-* *. **Exhibit-GJT9: Gravesham Borough Council v Secretary of State for the Environment [*] * P&CR *** -Description: it was held that a distinctive characteristic of a dwelling-house was its ability to afford those who used it, the facilities required for day-to-day private domestic existence. *. **Exhibit-GJT10: R (on the application of Mackay) v. Newham London Borough Council [*] EWHC * (Admin)** - Description: Case highlighting the importance of open hearings to uphold procedural fairness. *. **Exhibit-GJT11: Smith v. Northumberland County Council [*] EWHC * (Admin)** - Description: Case confirming the classification of properties with essential living facilities as 'Dwelling-Houses' with specific legal protections. https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/D-*-*?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&firstPage=true *. **Exhibit-GJT12: Brown v. Southwark Borough Council [*] EWCA Civ *** - Description: Case recognizing the property met 'Dwelling-House' criteria due to essential living facilities. *. **Exhibit-GJT13: Taylor v. Leeds City Council [*] EWCA Civ *** - Description: Case where the court acknowledged the legal protections of 'Dwelling-House' classification. *. **Exhibit-GJT14: Williams v. Horsham District Council [*] EWCA Civ *** - Description: Case where Williams successfully argued misclassification leading to a council tax refund. - https://vlex.co.uk/vid/r-williams-v-horsham-* *. **Exhibit-GJT15: Jones v. Liverpool City Council [*] EWHC * (Admin)** - Description: Case where Jones received a council tax refund after proving incorrect property classification. *. **Exhibit-GJT16: Shirley Lewald, Solicitor Advocate** - Description: Statement supporting that a court order is void if issued without jurisdiction, violating the law, or defying due process. *. **Exhibit-GJT17: Halsbury's Laws of England** - Description: Legal reference emphasizing the distinction between "Dwelling-House" and "dwelling" under housing laws and their respective protections. **Statement of Truth** I, Gary John Taylor, believe that the facts stated in this witness statement are true. Signed: __________ Date: * November *

can it help with dwelling-hounse

please write the relevant paragraph so i can include if it supports my claim

please add concise description to include in the exhibit list

where is the correct position in the witness statement to add **Procedural Adherence and Fairness in Council Decisions**:

continue

please check and repeat same produre with : vLex United Kingdom Your World of Legal Intelligence United Kingdom | +* (*) * * * Products Content Apps & Integrations Login Sign Up Home Case Law R (Williams) v Horsham District Council Judgment Weekly Law Reports The Times Law Reports Cited authorities * Cited in * Precedent Map RelatedVincent Jurisdiction England & Wales Judgment Date * January * Neutral Citation [*] EWCA Civ * Court Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Date * January * Docket Number C3/*/* Categories Local Government Local Government Finance Practice and Procedure Court Structure Property and Conveyancing Interest in Property Family Law Children Employment and Labour Law Employment Relationship [*] EWCA Civ * IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION) ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT ADMINISTRATIVE COURT LIST (MR JUSTICE MCCOMBE) Royal Courts of Justice Strand London, WC2A 2LL Before: The Master of The Rolls (Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers) Lord Justice Buxton Lord Justice Keene C3/*/* Mr Martin Williams Claimant/Respondent and Horsham District Council Defendant/Appellant MR JONATHAN EASTON (Instructed by Legal Dept. Horsham District Council, West Sussex, RH12 1RL) appeared on behalf of the Appellant The Respondent did not appear and was not represented. * LORD PHILLIPS, MR: This is the judgment of the court. Introduction * The respondent, Mr Williams, owns cottage called Pump Cottage, Henfield, West Sussex where he now lives in retirement with his wife. Between January * and August * Mr Williams was employed as a housemaster by Hurstpierpoint College ("the College") . The College provided him with a house at Hurstpierpoint called The Oaks. Mr Williams and his wife lived at The Oaks during this period. They stayed on there, by agreement with the College, until July *. By a decision dated * December * the West Sussex Valuation Tribunal held that Mr Williams had to pay Council Tax in respect of Pump Cottage on the grounds that he and his wife had their sole or main residence there during this period. It is Mr Williams' contention that he and his wife had their main residence at The Oaks. * By a judgment dated * June *, McCombe J allowed an appeal by Mr Williams against the Tribunal's decision. He held that the Tribunal had erred in their decision in that they had wrongly treated themselves as bound by case precedent to treat two of the relevant factors that they considered as of overriding importance. He remitted the case to the Tribunal for reconsideration. * The Horsham District Council now appeals against McCombe J's judgment with permission granted by Sedley LJ on * August *. The Council contends that the weight to be attached to the relevant factors was a matter for the Tribunal and it was not open to McCombe J to set aside the Tribunal's decision on the ground that disproportionate weight had been attached to two of those factors. The Facts * Before Mr and Mrs Williams moved to The Oaks, they were registered with a doctor and dentist in the neighbourhood of Pump Cottage. They remained so registered after their move. They were on the electoral roll for Pump Cottage, but also had their names placed on the roll for The Oaks. The College provided The Oaks part furnished. Mr and Mrs Williams moved most of their belongings and furniture from Pump Cottage to the Oaks. They left some furniture at Pump Cottage in case they should choose to stay there in the holidays. In fact they did not do so. Neither of them spent as much as a night in Pump Cottage during the relevant period, although Mr Williams paid periodic visits to it for the purpose of maintenance and in order to mow the lawn. When Mr Williams' employment as housemaster came to an end in August *, the College agreed that he and his wife could remain in residence at The Oaks until July the following year but made a charge for accommodation and Council Tax. * The attitude of the College at the time that Mr Williams took up his appointment as housemaster is indicated by this passage in a letter dated * November * written by the Bursar to all members of staff living in college accommodation following discussions with Mid-Sussex District Council: "The College will be obliged to declare that the school accommodation which you occupy is your 'main home' for Council Tax purposes. This means that if you own a house elsewhere in the UK you may be liable to pay Council Tax thereon. If your house is let the tenant will be responsible for the Council Tax; if it is empty then you will qualify for a *% discount on the full Council Tax for the property." * The provision of accommodation at The Oaks was part of Mr Williams' contractual emoluments and was treated as such for tax purposes. The same is true of Council Tax which the College paid in full on behalf of Mr Williams. * While employed by the College, Mr Williams continued to pay Council Tax, without discount, to Horsham Council. On * September *, however, he wrote to the Council asking for a rebate for the period between January * and July * on the ground that Pump Cottage was unoccupied while he and his wife were living at The Oaks. The Council responded asserting that Pump Cottage fell to be considered as the Williams' sole or main residence, and that The Oaks should he considered to be their second home so that a discount of * per cent should be recovered from the Mid-Sussex District Council in respect of Council Tax paid on the latter property. * Mid-Sussex Council was then made aware of the situation and refunded to the College * per cent of the Council Tax paid in respect of The Oaks while Mr and Mrs Williams were in residence. The statutory provisions * Section * of the Local Government Finance Act ("the Act") provides: "* Persons liable to pay council tax. (*) The person who is liable to pay council tax in respect of any chargeable dwelling and any day is the person who falls within the first paragraph of subsection (*) below to apply, taking paragraph (a) of that subsection first, paragraph (b) next, and so on. (*) A person falls within this subsection in relation to any chargeable dwelling and any day if, on that day— (a) he is a resident of the dwelling and has a freehold interest in the whole or any part of it; (b) he is such a resident and has a leasehold interest in the whole or any part of the dwelling which is not inferior to another such interest held by another such resident; (c) he is both such a resident and a statutory [secure or introductory tenant] of the whole or any part of the dwelling; (d) he is such a resident and has a contractual licence to occupy the whole or any part of the dwelling; (e) he is such a resident; or (f) he is the owner of the dwelling." * The critical issue before the Tribunal was whether Mr Williams was liable to pay Council Tax in respect of Pump Cottage as a resident with a freehold interest in it under section *(*) (a), or as the owner under section *(*) (f) . This was critical by reason of the provision for discount made by the following subsection of section * of the Act: "(*) Subject to section * below, the amount of council tax payable in respect of any chargeable dwelling and any day shall be subject to a discount equal to twice the appropriate percentage of that amount if on that day— (a) there is no resident of the dwelling; …. (*) In this section …. 'the appropriate percentage' means * per cent." * A resident is defined by section *(*) of the Act as follows: "'resident', in relation to any dwelling, means an individual who has attained the age of 18 years and has his sole or main residence in the dwelling." The Tribunal's decision * The Tribunal attached importance to three decisions, which is it is necessary briefly to summarise. Bradford Metropolitan City Council v Anderton [*] RA * concerned liability for Community Charge payable in respect of a person's sole or main residence. * The charge payer was a merchant seaman who spent most of his life at sea. About 90 days a year, when he was on leave, he lived with his wife in respect of which the Charge was levied. His wife lived there all the time. The rest of the time he lived at sea aboard the "Atlantic Conveyor". The Tribunal held that this vessel was his main residence. On appeal, Hutchinson J considered a number of authorities, which led him to the conclusion that a merchant ship plying the high seas could not constitute a person's residence. At page * Hutchinson J held that, even if this was not correct, the cases establish that: "….the respondent's sole or main residence is the house, because that is where his home is, where he has his settled and usual abode, which he leaves only when the exigencies of his occupation compel him to go to sea, for 'temporary or occasional absences of long or short duration'." * Ward v Kingston upon Hull City Council [*] RA * is another Community Charge case. In that case the husband and wife jointly owned a house in Hull where she lived. He, however, spent most of the year living in tied accommodation in Saudi Arabia where he worked, returning to Hull when on leave. The Tribunal, in holding that the house in Hull was his sole or main residence, attached importance to the fact that he had security of tenure in Hull, but not in Saudi Arabia. The issue on appeal was whether this was Wednesbury unreasonable. Auld J held that it was not. After referring to Anderton's case, he said at page *: "There is the obvious distinction between that case and this in that there the judge was concerned with the occupation by the applicant of a ship, when he was working as a seaman at sea, and of his matrimonial home when he was ashore. Here the case concerns two houses on dry land, but, apart from that distinction, there are a number of common factors. The most... To continue reading Request your trial * cases Nihal Mohammed Kamal Brake v Duncan Kenric Swift (as trustee of the estates of Nihal Brake and Andrew Brake) United Kingdom Chancery Division * July * ...para *(*)), Crawley BC v Sawyer (*) * HLR *, CA (“only or principal home” in the Housing Act *, s *), Williams v Horsham DC [*] * WLR *, CA (“sole or main residence” in Local Government Finance Act *, s *(*)); Islington BC v Boyle [*] PTSR *, CA (“only or principal ...... Hoh Kiang Ngan v Hoh Han Keyet Malaysia Court of Appeal (Malaysia) Invalid date Bennett v Copeland Borough Council United Kingdom Court of Appeal (Civil Division) * May * ...judge, and indeed since permission to appeal was given in this case, an important new authority has emerged from this court, R (Williams) v Horsham District Council, very recently reported in [*] * WLR *. * There this court had to consider the case of a council taxpayer, Mr Williams...... The Highland Council A Local Authority Constitute Under The Local Government Etc (scotland) Act * Against A Decision Of Highland And Western Isles United Kingdom Court of Session * August * ...[*] RA45, which was concerned with the meaning of the expression "sole or main residence", Regina v Horsham District Council [*] 1W.L.R. *, and Stevenson v Rogers * S.L.T. *. Essentially the appellant's contention was that, in reaching a conclusion as to whether a dwellinghous...... 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