Appealing Tribunal Costs Decision
Summary
To appeal a tribunal costs decision, highlight any misinterpretation of facts, such as peaceful protests being misjudged, and argue against the proportionality of costs. Emphasize any procedural unfairness or breaches of agreements and data protection laws. Ensure the appeal is submitted within the specified timeframe, clearly stating the grounds and desired outcome.Full Conversation
FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL
PROPERTY CHAMBER
(RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY)
Case Reference
:
CHI/00HN/LSC/*/* and CHI/00HN/LBC/*/*
Property
:
Flat *, * Admirals Walk, West Cliff Road, Bournemouth, BH2 5HH
Applicant
:
Admirals Walk * Limited
Representative
:
Cassandra Zanelli, solicitor, Property Management Legal Services Limited
Respondents
:
Kevin Roy Dixon
David Paul Bell
Representative
:
Not represented
Type of Application
:
(*) Application for costs Rule * of the Tribunal Procedure (First Tier Tribunal) (Property Chamber) Rules *
(*) Application paragraph 5A to Schedule * of the Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act *
(*) Application section 20C of the Landlord and Tenant Act *
Tribunal Members
:
Judge N P Jutton, Mr M J F Donaldson FRICS, Ms T Wong
Date
:
* July *
DECISION
© CROWN COPYRIGHT
* Introduction
* The Tribunal made its written decision in this matter on * June *. It determined that the Respondents had acted in breach of the terms of certain covenants contained in their lease. It made determinations as to the amount service charge payable by the Respondents for the year ending * March * and of estimated service charges payable on account for the years ending * March * and *.
* At the end of its Decision the Tribunal made Directions in respect of submissions for orders for costs or reimbursement of Tribunal fees under rule * of the Tribunal Procedure (first-tier Tribunal) (Property Chamber) Rules * or for Orders under section 20C of the Landlord and Tenant Act * or paragraph 5A of Part * of Schedule * to the Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act *.
* The Tribunal has received the following applications (and responses thereto):
(*) An application by the Respondents dated * April * for an order under paragraph 5A to Schedule * of the Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act * (the * Act) for an order to reduce or extinguish the Respondents liability to pay an administration charge in respect of litigation costs.
(*) An Application by the Respondents dated * April * for an order under section 20C of the Landlord and Tenant Act * (the * Act) that all or any of the costs incurred by the Applicant in connection with the proceedings before the Tribunal are not to be regarded as relevant costs to be taken into account in determining the amount of any service charge payable by the Respondents or any other person or persons specified in the application.
(*) An application by the Applicant dated * June * for an order for payment of costs and Tribunal fees by the Respondents pursuant to Rule * of the Tribunal Procedure (first-tier Tribunal) (Property Chamber) Rules * (the * Rules).
* The * Act Application
* Paragraph 5A part * of Schedule * of the * Act provides that a tenant of a dwelling in England may apply to the Tribunal for an order reducing or extinguishing the tenant’s liability to pay a particular administration charge in respect of ‘litigation costs’. ‘Litigation costs’ means inter alia costs incurred by the landlord in connection with proceedings before this Tribunal. The Tribunal may make whatever order on the application that it considers to be just and equitable.
* The grounds relied upon by the Respondents are very brief. They say that they wish to ensure that they and other residents are not charged with the costs of litigation. They also refer to an order that they seek in separate county court proceedings.
* Neither party has referred the Tribunal to the terms of the lease as regards a contractual liability for legal costs to be recovered as administration charges. Accordingly the Tribunal does not make a determination as to whether or not the lease allows for the recovery of litigation costs as administration charges. The Applicant may only recover litigation costs as administration charges from the Respondents if there is provision in the lease to allow that.
* The Applicant was successful with its application. It sought and was granted a determination that the Respondents had acted in breach of certain covenants in their lease. It sought and was granted a determination as to the amount of service charges payable for the year ending * March * and estimated service charges on account for the years ending * March * and *.
* In the circumstances the Tribunal declines to make an order reducing or extinguishing the Respondents liability to pay an administration charge in respect of litigation costs under paragraph 5A of part * of Schedule * of the * Act and dismisses the Respondents application in that regard.
* The * Act Application
* Section 20C of the * Act provides that a tenant may make an application for an order that all or any of the costs incurred by a landlord in connection with proceedings before this Tribunal are not to be regarded as relevant costs to be taken into account in determining the amount of any service charge payable by the tenant or any other person or persons specified in the application.
* In their application form the Respondents set out no grounds in support of their application. Neither party makes any submission to the Tribunal as to whether or not the Respondents lease allows litigation costs to be recovered by the Applicant as part of the service charges payable by the Respondents. Accordingly, the Tribunal does not make a determination as to whether or not the lease so allows. The Applicant can only recover litigation costs as part of the service charge payable by the Respondents if there is provision in the lease to allow that.
* The Applicant was successful with its application. It sought and was granted a determination that the Respondents had acted in breach of certain covenants in their lease. It sought and was granted a determination as to the amount of service charges payable by the Respondents for the year ending * March * and estimated service charges on account for the years ending * March * and *.
* In the circumstances the Tribunal declines to make an order that all or any of the costs incurred by the Applicant in connection with these proceedings are not to be regarded as relevant costs to be taken into account in determining the amount of any service charge payable by the Respondents and dismisses the Respondents application in that regard.
* The Rule * Application
* Rule *(*) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-Tier Tribunal) (Property Chamber) Rules * provides as follows:
“(*) The Tribunal may make an order in respect of costs only –
(a) under section *(*) of the * Act (wasted costs) and the costs incurred in applying for such costs;
(b) if a person has acted unreasonably in bringing, defending or conducting proceedings in –
….…
(ii) a residential property case”.
* Guidance was given by the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) in Willow Court Management Company (*) Limited & Others v Mrs Ratna Alexander & Others (*) UK UT * (LC) as to how the First-Tier Tribunal should in practice exercise the application of rule *.
* The Upper Tribunal identified a * stage process. The first stage was for the Tribunal to determine whether or not a person had acted unreasonably in bringing, defending or conducting the proceedings. The second stage was for the Tribunal to consider in light of unreasonable conduct that it found whether or not it ought to make an Order for costs. The third stage in the event the Tribunal decided to make an Order was what the terms of the Order should be.
* The Applicant seeks an order for costs solely in relation to the application in respect of the breach of covenant under section *(*) of the * Act. It does not seek an order for costs in relation to the service charge application bought under section 27A of the * Act. The Applicant says that the Respondents acted unreasonably in defending and conducting the proceedings in relation to the section *(*) application. Further the Applicant reasonably says that it does not seek an order in relation to all of the costs that it incurred in relation to section *(*) application. It acknowledges that there were elements of the evidence presented to the Tribunal which did not concern the Tribunal in determining the application brought. It therefore invites the Tribunal to make a partial rule * order in respect of its costs associated with section *(*) application. The Applicant says that taking a broad brush approach *% of its overall costs incurred should be disregarded as relating to the section 27A application. The Applicant acknowledges that elements of the evidence presented did not fall within Tribunal’s remit to determine under section *(*) and therefore seeks *% of the remaining costs. To apply that to the figures claimed for costs; the total costs that the Applicant says it has incurred are £*,*.* (being costs in the proceedings but excluding pre-litigation costs). If Tribunal fees are deducted from that sum and the resultant figure multiplied by *% a figure of £*,*.* is produced. The Applicant seeks *% of that sum i.e. £*,*.* (plus the application fee in respect of the section *(*) application and the hearing fee of £*).
* The Applicant says that the Respondents by their conduct have been found to have breached clauses *.* and *.* their lease. That the breach occurred between January * and March *. That the covenants are absolute covenants. That as such the Respondent’s argument that they were making a protest and thus that the breach was justified was irrelevant. The Applicant says the breaches were prolonged. That they were committed over a period of approximately 15 months. They were not accidental breaches but deliberate acts on the part of the Respondents. That the breaches caused considerable nuisance annoyance and anguish to other residents. That the breaches caused damage to property belonging to other residents. That despite formal letters being sent to the Respondents by the Applicants solicitors their behaviour did not stop. That the Respondents conceded that there were notices etc displayed from their balcony and windows but still maintained there was justification for this. That the Respondents knowingly continued with a defence which defence was always doomed to fail. There is as such the Applicant says no reasonable explanation for the conduct complained of and therefore the threshold is crossed and the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to make an order under Rule * is engaged.
* As to whether the Tribunal should make an order the Applicant says that it is a lessee owned and controlled company. That the application was brought as a result of Respondents conduct. That the Applicant had attempted to engage with the Respondents before making the application to the Tribunal. That instead of the Respondents modifying their behaviour, that behaviour and the volume of notices (and damage to property) increased. That the Applicant was left with little choice but to bring the proceedings. That in those circumstances it would be neither just nor equitable for the Respondents to avoid some liability for the Applicant’s costs.
* The Respondents say that the Applicant acted unreasonably in continuing with the proceedings in the knowledge that the Respondents had remedied the breach of covenant on * January * in respect of the balcony and in early March to * respect of the windows. The Respondents say they were justified in their ‘protest’ because of the Applicant’s actions.
* The Respondents say that the Applicant continued with section *(*) application to harass them and to allow them less time to address the section 27A application. They do not accept that their conduct of the case was unreasonable. The Applicant was wrong, they say, to ‘aggressively’ pursue its application in the knowledge that the cause of action had been remedied. The Respondents say that they have acted reasonably in their conduct of proceedings in accordance with the Tribunals procedures ‘as well as any layperson would understand them’. The Respondents complain of the Applicant’s conduct in the form of alleged harassment and stalking of them. The Respondents complain of the Applicant’s alleged conduct inter alia in not honouring a settlement reached in previous County Court proceedings, in a failure to produce invoices and documents, in an alleged breach of the Data Protection Act * and in respect of alleged communications with the Respondents mortgagee. The Respondents alleged that the Applicant’s witnesses have lied in witness statements and to the Tribunal. They make various allegations as to the conduct historically of the Applicant and its agents.
* The Tribunals Decision
* The first question that the Tribunal asks itself is whether the Respondents acted unreasonably in defending the section *(*) application or in their conduct of the proceedings.
* The question of whether behaviour might be regarded as unreasonable was addressed by the Upper Tribunal in Willow Court (and with reference to the court of appeal decision in Ridehalgh v Horsefield (*) Ch *) at paragraph *:
‘An assessment of whether behaviour is unreasonable requires a value judgement on which views might differ but the standard of behaviour expected of parties in tribunal proceedings ought not be set at an unrealistic level. We see no reason to depart from the guidance given in Ridehalgh at 232E, despite the slightly different context. “Unreasonable” conduct includes conduct which is vexatious, and designed to harass the other side rather than advance the resolution of the case. The test may be expressed in different ways. Would a reasonable person in the position of the party have conducted themselves in the manner complained of? Or Sir Thomas Bingham’s “acid test”: is there a reasonable explanation for the conduct complained of?’
* Further at paragraph * when considering the position of unrepresented parties:
‘ In the context of rule *(*)(b) we consider that the fact that a party acts without legal advice is relevant to the first stage of the inquiry. When considering objectively whether a party has acted reasonably or not, the question is whether a reasonable person in the circumstances in which the party in question found themselves would have acted in the way in which that party acted. In making that assessment it would be wrong, we consider, to assume a greater degree of legal knowledge or familiarity with the procedures of the tribunal and the conduct of the proceedings before it, then is in fact possessed by the party whose conduct is under consideration. The behaviour of unrepresented party with no legal knowledge should be judged by the standards of the reasonable person who does not have legal advice. The crucial question is always whether, in all the circumstances of the case, the party has acted unreasonably in the conduct of the proceedings.’
* The Respondents concede that the notices etc were displayed from their balcony and windows. Their defence was that they were justified in doing so. That their actions were a form of protest against the perceived actions and behaviour of the Applicant and its agents. The Respondents do not accept that their actions constituted a nuisance or annoyance to other residents. The question is was the failure of the Respondents as lay persons to properly appreciate the weakness of their defence unreasonable? Would a reasonable person without the benefit of legal advice reasonably have believed that the defence raised by Respondents had a chance of success? The Tribunal is not concerned with the historic behaviour of the Respondents in breaching the covenants but whether or not they acted unreasonably in defending the proceedings.
* Willow made it clear that the Tribunal should not be overzealous in detecting unreasonable conduct after the event. That a failure by a party to appreciate the strengths or weaknesses of their own or their opponents case should not be treated as unreasonable. In this case however the Tribunal is satisfied the Respondents knew and understood that their actions in displaying notices et cetera from the balcony and windows of their flat constituted a breach of the covenant at *.* of their lease. The wording of the covenant is clear, is ; ‘Not to display any notice or advertisement either on the outside of the property or visible from outside it’. In the view of the Tribunal a reasonable person without the benefit of legal advice would not in the circumstances have reasonably believed that displaying notices containing allegations such as ‘this block is corrupt’ (e.g. see pages *-*, *-*, *-* of the hearing bundle) was a form of protest that justified their actions and would constitute a defence to a breach of the covenant at clause *.* of the lease. The Tribunal has no doubt that the Respondents knew well that they were acting in breach of the said covenant but that they continued with their actions, to include defending these proceedings, as a form provocation against the Applicant, its agents and certain other lessees. The Respondents continued, in the view of the Tribunal unreasonably, to defend the Applicants section *(*) application up to and including the hearing. As such, in all the circumstances in the view of the Tribunal the Respondents acted unreasonably in defending that application.
* The second question that the Tribunal asks itself is whether or not in light of the Respondents unreasonable conduct in defending the proceedings it ought to make an order for costs. It is clear that the Respondent’s behaviour in continuing to defend the application or even to acknowledge that they had acted in breach of the covenant incurred the Applicant in substantial costs. It is disingenuous of the Respondents to argue that the Applicant acted unreasonably in continuing with the application after the notices and banners had been removed from the balcony and windows of their flat. It was open to the Respondents at any time during the proceedings to admit to a breach of covenant (albeit after the notice and banners were removed, to an historic breach) which would no doubt have brought the application to a conclusion. The Applicant is a company owned by the lessees. It would in the circumstances in view of the Tribunal be inequitable for the Applicant (and ultimately the lessees) to bear the entirety of the costs of the application.
* The third question that the Tribunal asks itself is what are the terms of the order that it should make. The Applicant seeks an order for costs in respect of the section *(*) application only. Taking a broad brush approach it puts those at *% of its total costs. In the view of the Tribunal, having regard to the paperwork and the amount of time spent on each issue that is a reasonable apportionment. The Applicant acknowledges that certain elements of its submissions to the Tribunal were irrelevant to the issues before the Tribunal and accordingly in the circumstances seeks an order for *% of the balance of its costs. Having regard to the evidence before it and to the submissions made by the Applicant to it, the Tribunal is satisfied that constitutes a reasonable reduction in the balance of the Applicants costs.
* The Applicant has filed a statement of its total costs using County Court form N260. The Tribunal makes a summary assessment of those costs. The Tribunal is satisfied that the hourly rates claimed for each grade of fee earner are reasonable. In relation to the costs as a whole and the assessment thereof the Tribunal bears in mind that this was not a particularly complex matter either legally nor factually. It was not a case that required any particular skill or expertise. The Tribunal does take into account the conduct of the Respondents, which undoubtedly caused additional work to be done. The Tribunal makes the following reductions:
• The Applicant claims a total of * hours * minutes on letters/emails with the Applicant. The total amount of time claimed is in the view of the Tribunal unreasonable in amount. The Tribunal allows a total of eight hours a reduction of £*,*.
• As they are dealt with below under the application for the repayment of the application and hearing fees the Tribunal removes the total sum of £* in respect of tribunal fees from its assessment.
• It is unreasonable for time spent in travelling and waiting to be charged at the Applicant’s solicitors full hourly charge out rate. The amount claimed is £*, the Tribunal allows *% a reduction of £*,*.*
• The Applicant claims ‘Applicant’s fees’ for attending the hearing of £*,*.*. These are presumably fees charged by the Applicant’s agent for the time spent by Mrs Lacey-Payne in attending the hearing. Mrs Lacey-Payne did not attend as an expert witness. The Tribunal disallows this item. (Whether such fees are recoverable under the terms of the lease as either service charges or administration fees is not something which the Tribunal addresses here).
* The Tribunal is satisfied that the remainder of the Applicants costs were reasonably incurred and are reasonable in amount. The effect of the above reductions is to reduce the total profit costs claimed net of VAT from £*,* to £*,*.* a total inclusive of VAT of £*,*.*. The Tribunal fees and expenses are reduced from £*,*.* to £*.*. That leaves a balance of £*,*.*. The Tribunal is satisfied that that sum is proportionate in amount. *% of that sum is £*,*.* and *% thereof £*,*.* which taking a broad brush approach the Tribunal rounds down to £*,*.*.
* The Tribunal Orders the Respondents to pay to the Applicant within 21 days of the date of this decision costs of £*,*.
* The Applicant also seeks an order under rule *(*) requiring the Respondents to reimburse it the fees paid by it, that is an application fee of £* and a hearing fee of £*. The Applicant has been successful in its application under section *(*). The Respondents were warned in the form of letters before action of the potential consequences of not remedying the breaches of covenant. Although they did belatedly remedy those breaches the only did so after these proceedings had been instituted and they continued to defend their historic breaches before this Tribunal. In all the circumstances the Tribunals is satisfied that it is just and equitable to make an order that the Respondents reimburse the Tribunal fees paid by the Applicant in the total sum of £*, to be paid within 21 days of the date of this decision.
* Summary of Decision
(*) The Tribunal declines to make an order under paragraph 5A of part * of Schedule * of the Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act * reducing or extinguishing the Respondents liability to pay an administration charge in respect of litigation costs and accordingly the Respondent’s application in that regard is dismissed.
(*) The Tribunal declines to make an order under section 20C of the Landlord and Tenant Act * that the costs incurred by Applicant in connection with these proceedings are not to be regarded as relevant costs to be taken into account in determining the amount of any service charge payable and accordingly the Respondent’s application in that regard is dismissed.
(*) The Tribunal Orders the Respondents to pay to the Applicant costs of £*,* within 21 days of the date of this Decision.
(*) The Tribunal Orders the Respondents to reimburse to the Applicant Tribunal fees paid by the Applicant of £* to be paid within 21 days of the date of this Decision.
Dated this 23rd day of July *
Judge N P Jutton
Appeals
*. A person wishing to appeal this decision to the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) must seek permission to do so by making written application by email to rpsouthern@justice.gov.uk to the First-tier Tribunal at the Regional office which has been dealing with the case.
*. The application must arrive at the Tribunal within 28 days after the Tribunal sends to the person making the application written reasons for the decision.
*. If the person wishing to appeal does not comply with the *-day time limit, the person shall include with the application for permission to appeal a request for an extension of time and the reason for not complying with the *-day time limit; the Tribunal will then decide whether to extend time or not to allow the application for permission to appeal to proceed.
*. The application for permission to appeal must identify the decision of the Tribunal to which it relates, state the grounds of appeal, and state the result the party making the application is seeking.
Hello Mr. Dixon and Mr. Bell,
Thank you for sharing the details. To assist you better, could you please clarify the following:
- Are you appealing the £*,* costs ordered by the Tribunal, the £* tribunal fees, or both?
This will help provide precise guidance on the appeal process.
Thank you.
Thank you for sharing the details. To assist you better, could you please clarify the following:
- Are you appealing the £*,* costs ordered by the Tribunal, the £* tribunal fees, or both?
This will help provide precise guidance on the appeal process.
Thank you.
both
Thank you for clarifying. Here are some general points to consider for your appeal:
- **Misinterpretation of Law and Facts**: Highlight specific errors in the Tribunal's interpretation.
- **Unreasonable Conduct**: Argue why your conduct was reasonable, referencing relevant points from the Tribunal's decision.
- **Proportionality of Costs**: Challenge the reasonableness and proportionality of the £*,* costs and the £* tribunal fees.
Ensure your appeal is submitted within 28 days, and clearly state your grounds and desired outcome.
- **Misinterpretation of Law and Facts**: Highlight specific errors in the Tribunal's interpretation.
- **Unreasonable Conduct**: Argue why your conduct was reasonable, referencing relevant points from the Tribunal's decision.
- **Proportionality of Costs**: Challenge the reasonableness and proportionality of the £*,* costs and the £* tribunal fees.
Ensure your appeal is submitted within 28 days, and clearly state your grounds and desired outcome.
could you review my draft
Certainly! Based on your scenario, here’s a concise review for your draft appeal letter.
---
---
Draft Appeal Letter
**To: The Lands Chamber**
Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) HMCTS
5th Floor, Rolls Building, Fetter Lane, London, EC4A 1NL
**From:**
Mr. Kevin Dixon and Mr. David Bell
* Admirals Walk
West Cliff Road
Bournemouth
BH2 5HH
**Date:**
* October *
**Re: Application for Permission to Appeal – First-tier Tribunal Costs Decision**
**Introduction:**
- We seek permission to appeal the First-tier Tribunal's costs decision dated * July *.
- Tribunal Case References: CHI/00HN/LSC/*/* and CHI/00HN/LBC/*/*.
**Grounds for Appeal:**
*. **Misinterpretation of Law and Facts:**
- The judge misinterpreted our protest as an unreasonable defence, despite the alleged breach of the covenant being remedied before the first video conference on * April * and the Tribunal hearing on * June *.
- The decision fails to consider the context and nature of
**To: The Lands Chamber**
Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) HMCTS
5th Floor, Rolls Building, Fetter Lane, London, EC4A 1NL
**From:**
Mr. Kevin Dixon and Mr. David Bell
* Admirals Walk
West Cliff Road
Bournemouth
BH2 5HH
**Date:**
* October *
**Re: Application for Permission to Appeal – First-tier Tribunal Costs Decision**
**Introduction:**
- We seek permission to appeal the First-tier Tribunal's costs decision dated * July *.
- Tribunal Case References: CHI/00HN/LSC/*/* and CHI/00HN/LBC/*/*.
**Grounds for Appeal:**
*. **Misinterpretation of Law and Facts:**
- The judge misinterpreted our protest as an unreasonable defence, despite the alleged breach of the covenant being remedied before the first video conference on * April * and the Tribunal hearing on * June *.
- The decision fails to consider the context and nature of
The Judge has said that he sees the protest as provocation ignoring the landlord's failure to respond to the ICO and the applicants correspondencem- how can I spell this out
To effectively spell out the issue of the judge misinterpreting your protest as provocation and ignoring the landlord's failure to respond, you can include specific points in your appeal letter. Here’s how you might draft that section:
---
**Grounds for Appeal:**
*. **Misinterpretation of Law and Facts:**
- The judge misinterpreted our peaceful protest as an unreasonable defence. This protest was in response to the landlord's continuous failure to address our concerns and respond to our correspondence, including communications with the Information Commissioner's Office (ICO).
- The decision overlooks the landlord's failure to respond to our communications, which precipitated our protest. This lack of response from the landlord was a significant factor that should have been considered in determining the reasonableness of our actions.
- The alleged breach of the covenant was remedied before the first video conference on * April * and the Tribunal hearing on * June *. The judge failed to take this into account adequately, which unfairly influenced the decision on costs.
**Unreasonable Conduct:**
- Our actions were a direct response to the landlord’s non-compliance and failure to engage with our legitimate concerns. We believe a reasonable person in our position would have acted similarly under
---
**Grounds for Appeal:**
*. **Misinterpretation of Law and Facts:**
- The judge misinterpreted our peaceful protest as an unreasonable defence. This protest was in response to the landlord's continuous failure to address our concerns and respond to our correspondence, including communications with the Information Commissioner's Office (ICO).
- The decision overlooks the landlord's failure to respond to our communications, which precipitated our protest. This lack of response from the landlord was a significant factor that should have been considered in determining the reasonableness of our actions.
- The alleged breach of the covenant was remedied before the first video conference on * April * and the Tribunal hearing on * June *. The judge failed to take this into account adequately, which unfairly influenced the decision on costs.
**Unreasonable Conduct:**
- Our actions were a direct response to the landlord’s non-compliance and failure to engage with our legitimate concerns. We believe a reasonable person in our position would have acted similarly under
Could you review my draft please to make it as strong as possible
Certainly! Here is a revised version of your draft appeal letter, making it as strong and clear as possible:
---
**To: The Lands Chamber**
Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) HMCTS
5th Floor, Rolls Building
Fetter Lane
London, EC4A 1NL
**From:**
Mr. Kevin Dixon and Mr. David Bell
* Admirals Walk
West Cliff Road
Bournemouth
BH2 5HH
**Date:**
* October *
**Re: Application for Permission to Appeal – First-tier Tribunal Costs Decision**
**Introduction:**
- We seek permission to appeal the First-tier Tribunal's costs decision dated * July *.
- Tribunal Case References: CHI/00HN/LSC/*/* and CHI/00HN/LBC/*/*.
**Grounds for Appeal:**
*. **Misinterpretation of Law and Facts:**
- The judge misinterpreted our peaceful protest as an unreasonable defence. This protest was in response to the landlord's continuous failure to address our concerns and respond to our correspondence, including communications with the Information Commissioner's Office (ICO).
- The decision overlooks the landlord's failure
---
**To: The Lands Chamber**
Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) HMCTS
5th Floor, Rolls Building
Fetter Lane
London, EC4A 1NL
**From:**
Mr. Kevin Dixon and Mr. David Bell
* Admirals Walk
West Cliff Road
Bournemouth
BH2 5HH
**Date:**
* October *
**Re: Application for Permission to Appeal – First-tier Tribunal Costs Decision**
**Introduction:**
- We seek permission to appeal the First-tier Tribunal's costs decision dated * July *.
- Tribunal Case References: CHI/00HN/LSC/*/* and CHI/00HN/LBC/*/*.
**Grounds for Appeal:**
*. **Misinterpretation of Law and Facts:**
- The judge misinterpreted our peaceful protest as an unreasonable defence. This protest was in response to the landlord's continuous failure to address our concerns and respond to our correspondence, including communications with the Information Commissioner's Office (ICO).
- The decision overlooks the landlord's failure
Grounds for Appeal
*. Introduction:
a. I am seeking permission to appeal the First-tier Tribunal's costs decision dated * July *.
b. Tribunal Case Reference: CHI/00HN/LSC/*/* and CHI/00HN/LBC/*/*.
Misinterpretation of Law and Facts
*. The judge misinterpreted our peaceful protest as an unreasonable defence. This protest responded to the landlord's continuous failure to address our concerns and respond to our correspondence, including communications with the Information Commissioner's Office (ICO).
*. The decision overlooks the landlord's failure to respond to our communications, precipitating our protest. This lack of response from the landlord was a significant factor that should have been considered in determining the reasonableness of our actions.
*. The alleged breach of the covenant was remedied before the first video conference on * April * and the Tribunal hearing on * June *. The judge failed to consider this adequately, unfairly influencing the cost decision.
Unreasonable Conduct
*. Our actions directly responded to the landlord’s non-compliance and failure to engage with our legitimate concerns. We believe a reasonable person in our position would have acted similarly under such extreme pressure in and around our home.
*. The decision fails to consider the context and nature of our balcony protest, which was nonviolent and aimed at addressing the injustice of breaches to the July * Tomlin Agreement and Consent Order and breaches to the Applicant's rights under the UK personal data legislation.
Proportionality of Costs
*. Challenge the proportionality of the £*,* cost order.
*. The penalty of £*,* the First-tier Tribunal imposed undermines these fundamental rights.
*. the cost order relates solely to the breach of covenant due to the balcony protest and not to the decisions relating to service charges.
*. The Landlord chose to employ legal representation at its own cost and has an experienced Managing Agent who could have represented the landlord.
*. The balcony and windows were clear well before the * April * video conference, and therefore the alleged breach had already been remedied
*. There was no need for the Landlord to produce additional material, including witness statements including unsubstantiated allegations to which the Applicants understood they had to respond to
*. The £*,* costs do not relate to service charges, so they do not relate to any loss incurred by the Landlord.
*. No protest would have taken place but for the Landlord and Agents failure to comply with the Tomlin Agreement and Data Protection Act
Procedural Fairness
*. The Applicant did not receive notification of the * April * video conference until the hearing was in progress. Upon discovering a hearing, Mr Dixon immediately telephoned the video conference.
*. The Applicant notified the First-tier Tribunal that Mr. Bell suffers from Tourette’s syndrome, anxiety defect, and asthma and asked for reasonable adjustments, including documents to be sent by post as well as additional time for reading documents and a change of venue. The Tribunal granted none of these requests.
*. At the * June * Tribunal hearing, the Landlord’s witness statements, and representative sought to demean Mr Bell, referring to him as
Just and Equitable Consideration
*. The Rule * Application
*. Rule *(*) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-Tier Tribunal) (Property Chamber) Rules * provides as follows:
“(*) The Tribunal may make an order in respect of costs only –
(a) under section *(*) of the * Act (wasted costs) and the costs incurred in applying for such costs.
(b) if a person has acted unreasonably in bringing, defending or conducting proceedings in –
(c) (ii) a residential property case”.
Willow Court Case – Upper Tribunal Guidance
*. Guidance was given by the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) in Willow Court Management Company (*) Limited & Others v Mrs Ratna Alexander & Others (*) UK UT * (LC) as to how the First-Tier Tribunal should in practice exercise the application of rule *.
*. The Upper Tribunal identified a *-stage process. The first stage was for the Tribunal to determine whether a person had acted unreasonably in bringing, defending or conducting the proceedings. The second stage was for the Tribunal to consider whether it ought to make an Order for costs in light of unreasonable conduct. The third stage in the event the Tribunal decided to make an Order was what the terms of the Order should be.
*. The Landlord sought an order for costs solely in relation to the application in respect of the breach of covenant under section *(*) of the * Act. It did not seek an order for costs in relation to the service charge application bought under section 27A of the * Act.
*. The costs order should be extinguished
Specific Relief Sought
*. The Applicant’s request that the Upper Tribunal overturns the First-tier Tribunal’s decisions relating to the £*,* cost order and £* tribunal fees
*. The Applicant’s request that the Upper Tribunal overturns the First-tier Tribunal’s decisions relating to
a. An application by the Respondents dated * April * for an order under paragraph 5A to Schedule * of the Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act * (the * Act) for an order to reduce or extinguish the Respondents liability to pay an administration charge in respect of litigation costs.
*. The tribunal declined to make an order reducing or extinguishing the Respondent's liability to pay an administration charge in respect of litigation costs under paragraph 5A of part * of Schedule * of the * Act. It dismissed the Respondent's application in that regard.
*. An Application by the Respondents dated * April * for an order under section 20C of the Landlord and Tenant Act * (the * Act) that all or any of the costs incurred by the Applicant in connection with the proceedings before the Tribunal are not to be regarded as relevant costs to be taken into account in determining the amount of any service charge payable by the Respondents or any other person or persons specified in the application.
*. The Tribunal declined to make an order that all or any of the costs incurred by the Applicant in connection with these proceedings are not to be regarded as relevant costs to be taken into account in determining the amount of any service charge payable by the Respondents and dismisses the Respondents application in that regard.
July * Tomlin Agreement Breach:
*. The Tomlin Agreement consent order recorded a settlement between the parties. (Exhibit *)
*. Following the Landlord’s alleged breach of the settlement agreement in July *, the Applicant applied to the County court to enforce the agreement. The Applicants sought specific performance and a claim for damages due to the Landlord's breach. Correspondence demonstrating the Landlord’s demand and breach of confidentiality are enclosed (Exhibit *)
*. The Landlord’s excess demand is £*,*, breaching the Settlement Agreement. (Exhibit *)
*. The Landlord’s failure to respond to the Applicant’s correspondence breached the Tomlin Agreement. (Exhibit *)
Human Rights Violations:
*. Under Article * (Freedom of Expression) and Article * (Freedom of Assembly) of the European Convention on Human Rights, our right to protest non-violently from our balcony should be protected.
*. The harsh penalty of £*,* the First-tier Tribunal imposed undermines these fundamental rights.
Disability Discrimination:
*. Applicants have been unfairly targeted by the landlord, evidenced by stalking, harassment, and threatening letters and fundamental rights of free expression on his property
*. This constitutes disability discrimination under the Equality Act *.
Data Protection Breach:
*. The Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) confirmed a breach of our data by the landlord and agent.
*. The First-tier Tribunal judge ignored this breach, which is a significant oversight affecting the fairness of the proceedings.
*. This oversight led to an unjust cost decision, ignoring crucial evidence that could have influenced the tribunal's view on the reasonableness of our defence.
Supporting Evidence
*. ICO's confirmation of the data breach (attached).
*. Correspondence and documentation related to the data breach (attached).
*. Evidence of the remedied breach of covenant (attached).
*. Documentation of the protest and the nature of the assembly (attached).
*. Medical documentation regarding my partner’s Tourette's syndrome (attached).
Conclusion:
*. Given the significant legal and factual oversights, human rights violations, disability discrimination, and data protection breaches, I respectfully request permission to appeal.
*. I am available for any further clarification or documentation that may be required.
Certainly! Here is a revised and condensed version of your appeal letter, focusing on the key points and ensuring clarity and conciseness:
---
**To: The Lands Chamber**
Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) HMCTS
5th Floor, Rolls Building
Fetter Lane
London, EC4A 1NL
**From:**
Mr. Kevin Dixon and Mr. David Bell
* Admirals Walk
West Cliff Road
Bournemouth
BH2 5HH
**Date:**
* October *
**Re: Application for Permission to Appeal – First-tier Tribunal Costs Decision**
**Introduction:**
- We seek permission to appeal the First-tier Tribunal's costs decision dated * July *.
- Tribunal Case References: CHI/00HN/LSC/*/* and CHI/00HN/LBC/*/*.
**Grounds for Appeal:**
*. **Misinterpretation of Law and Facts:**
- The judge misinterpreted our peaceful protest as an unreasonable defence, which was in response to the landlord's ongoing failure to address our concerns and respond to our communications, including those with the ICO.
- The decision failed to consider the landlord's lack of
---
**To: The Lands Chamber**
Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) HMCTS
5th Floor, Rolls Building
Fetter Lane
London, EC4A 1NL
**From:**
Mr. Kevin Dixon and Mr. David Bell
* Admirals Walk
West Cliff Road
Bournemouth
BH2 5HH
**Date:**
* October *
**Re: Application for Permission to Appeal – First-tier Tribunal Costs Decision**
**Introduction:**
- We seek permission to appeal the First-tier Tribunal's costs decision dated * July *.
- Tribunal Case References: CHI/00HN/LSC/*/* and CHI/00HN/LBC/*/*.
**Grounds for Appeal:**
*. **Misinterpretation of Law and Facts:**
- The judge misinterpreted our peaceful protest as an unreasonable defence, which was in response to the landlord's ongoing failure to address our concerns and respond to our communications, including those with the ICO.
- The decision failed to consider the landlord's lack of
could you review my final draft please
Sure, here is a revised and condensed version of your appeal letter, focusing on clarity and the key points:
---
**To: The Lands Chamber**
Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) HMCTS
5th Floor, Rolls Building
Fetter Lane
London, EC4A 1NL
**From:**
Mr. Kevin Dixon and Mr. David Bell
* Admirals Walk
West Cliff Road
Bournemouth
BH2 5HH
**Date:**
* October *
**Re: Application for Permission to Appeal – First-tier Tribunal Costs Decision**
**Introduction:**
- We seek permission to appeal the First-tier Tribunal's costs decision dated * July *.
- Tribunal Case References: CHI/00HN/LSC/*/* and CHI/00HN/LBC/*/*.
**Grounds for Appeal:**
*. **Misinterpretation of Law and Facts:**
- The judge misinterpreted our peaceful protest as an unreasonable defence. This protest responded to the landlord's continuous failure to address our concerns and respond to our correspondence, including communications with the Information Commissioner's Office (ICO).
- The decision overlooks the landlord's failure to respond to our
---
**To: The Lands Chamber**
Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) HMCTS
5th Floor, Rolls Building
Fetter Lane
London, EC4A 1NL
**From:**
Mr. Kevin Dixon and Mr. David Bell
* Admirals Walk
West Cliff Road
Bournemouth
BH2 5HH
**Date:**
* October *
**Re: Application for Permission to Appeal – First-tier Tribunal Costs Decision**
**Introduction:**
- We seek permission to appeal the First-tier Tribunal's costs decision dated * July *.
- Tribunal Case References: CHI/00HN/LSC/*/* and CHI/00HN/LBC/*/*.
**Grounds for Appeal:**
*. **Misinterpretation of Law and Facts:**
- The judge misinterpreted our peaceful protest as an unreasonable defence. This protest responded to the landlord's continuous failure to address our concerns and respond to our correspondence, including communications with the Information Commissioner's Office (ICO).
- The decision overlooks the landlord's failure to respond to our
Grounds for Appeal
Introduction:
*. The Applicants are seeking permission to appeal the First-tier Tribunal's costs decision dated * July *.
*. Tribunal Case Reference: CHI/00HN/LSC/*/* and CHI/00HN/LBC/*/*.
Misinterpretation of Law and Facts
*. The judge misunderstood our peaceful protest as an unreasonable defence in response to the landlord's ongoing failure to address our concerns and respond to our and ICO communications
*. The decision failed to consider the landlord's lack of response to our communications, a key obligation listed in the Tomlin Agreement, precipitating our protest. This lack of response from the landlord was a significant factor that should have been considered in determining the reasonableness of our actions.
*. The alleged breach of the covenant was remedied before the first video conference on * April * and the Tribunal hearing on * June *. The judge failed to consider this adequately, unfairly influencing the cost decision.
Unreasonable Conduct
*. The Applicants' actions directly responded to the landlord’s non-compliance and failure to engage with our legitimate concerns. We believe a reasonable person in our position would have acted similarly under such extreme pressure in and around our home.
*. The decision fails to consider the context and nature of our balcony protest, which was nonviolent and aimed at addressing the injustice of breaches to the July * Tomlin Agreement and Consent Order and breaches to the Applicant's rights under the UK personal data legislation.
Proportionality of Costs
*. The applicant is challenging the proportionality of the £*,* cost order. The cost order only pertains to the balcony protest and breach of covenant, and not to the First-tier Tribunal’s decision regarding service charges.
*. The £*,* penalty imposed by the First-tier Tribunal undermines the fundamental human right to protest.
*. The landlord chose to hire legal representation at its own cost and an experienced Managing Agent, Napier Management Services Ltd, who is well-versed in First-tier Tribunal procedures. The Managing Agent could have represented the landlord.
*. The balcony and windows were clear well before the 24th of April * video conference, and therefore the alleged breach had already been remedied.
*. There was no need for the landlord to produce additional material, including witness statements with unsubstantiated allegations, to which the applicants understood they had to respond.
*. The £*,* costs do not relate to service charges, so they do not relate to any loss incurred by the landlord. No protest would have taken place if the landlord and agents had complied with the Tomlin Agreement and the Data Protection Act.
Procedural Fairness
*. The Applicant was not notified of the video conference scheduled for * April * until the hearing was already underway. Upon realizing this, Mr. Dixon immediately called into the video conference. However, the Judge proceeded with the hearing without admitting Mr. Dixon. Since there is no transcript of the video hearing, the Applicants do not know whether the Landlord’s representative informed the judge that the balcony and windows were clean and that the protest had ended on * January *.
*. In addition, the Applicant informed the First-tier Tribunal that Mr. Bell suffers from Tourette’s syndrome, anxiety, and asthma, and requested reasonable adjustments, including receiving documents by post, extra time for reading documents, and a change of venue. However, the Tribunal did not grant any of these requests. Furthermore, during the Tribunal hearing on * June *, the Landlord’s witness statements and representative attempted to belittle Mr. Bell by referring to him as "stupid” and questioning whether he had Tourette’s Syndrome.
Just and Equitable Consideration
*. .The Rule * Application
*. Rule *(*) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-Tier Tribunal) (Property Chamber) Rules * provides as follows:
*. “(*) The Tribunal may make an order in respect of costs only –
(a) under section *(*) of the * Act (wasted costs) and the costs incurred in applying for such costs.
(b) if a person has acted unreasonably in bringing, defending or conducting proceedings in –
(c) (ii) a residential property case”.
Willow Court Case – Upper Tribunal Guidance
*. Guidance was given by the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) in Willow Court Management Company (*) Limited & Others v Mrs. Ratna Alexander & Others (*) UK UT * (LC) as to how the First-Tier Tribunal should, in practice, exercise the application of rule *.
*. The Upper Tribunal identified a *-stage process. The first stage was for the Tribunal to determine whether a person had acted unreasonably in bringing, defending, or conducting the proceedings. The second stage was for the Tribunal to consider whether it ought to make an Order for costs in light of unreasonable conduct. The third stage in the event the Tribunal decided to make an Order was what the terms of the Order should be.
Specific Relief Sought
*. The Applicant requests that the Upper Tribunal overturn the First-tier Tribunal’s decisions relating to the £*,* cost order and £* tribunal fees.
*. The Applicant requests that the Upper Tribunal overturn the First-tier Tribunal’s decisions relating to:
*. An application by the Respondents dated * April * for an order under paragraph 5A to Schedule * of the Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act * (the * Act) for an order to reduce or extinguish the Respondents' liability to pay an administration charge in respect of litigation costs.
*. The tribunal declined to make an order reducing or extinguishing the Respondent's liability to pay an administration charge in respect of litigation costs under paragraph 5A of part * of Schedule * of the * Act. It dismissed the Respondent's application in that regard.
*. An application by the Respondents dated * April * for an order under section 20C of the Landlord and Tenant Act * (the * Act) that all or any of the costs incurred by the Applicant in connection with the proceedings before the Tribunal are not to be regarded as relevant costs to be taken into account in determining the amount of any service charge payable by the Respondents or any other person or persons specified in the application.
*. The Tribunal declined to make an order that all or any of the costs incurred by the Applicant in connection with these proceedings are not to be regarded as relevant costs to be taken into account in determining the amount of any service charge payable by the Respondents and dismisses the Respondents' application in that regard.
July * Tomlin Agreement Breach:
*. The Tomlin Agreement consent order recorded a settlement between the parties (Exhibit *).
*. Following the Landlord’s alleged breach of the settlement agreement in July *, the Applicant applied to the County Court to enforce the agreement. The Applicant sought specific performance and a claim for damages due to the Landlord's breach. Correspondence demonstrating the Landlord’s demand and breach of confidentiality are enclosed (Exhibit *).
*. The Landlord’s excess demand is £*,*, breaching the Settlement Agreement (Exhibit *).
*. .The Landlord’s failure to respond to the Applicant’s correspondence breached the Tomlin Agreement (Exhibit *).
Human Rights Violations:
*. Under Article * (Freedom of Expression) and Article * (Freedom of Assembly) of the European Convention on Human Rights, our right to protest non-violently from our balcony should be protected.
*. The harsh penalty of £*,* imposed by the First-tier Tribunal undermines these fundamental rights.
Disability Discrimination:
*. The landlord has unfairly targeted applicants, evidenced by stalking, harassment, and threatening letters, which infringe on our fundamental rights of free expression on his property.
*. This constitutes disability discrimination under the Equality Act *.
Data Protection Breach:
*. The Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) confirmed that the landlord and agent breached our data.
*. The First-tier Tribunal judge ignored this breach, which is a significant oversight affecting the fairness of the proceedings.
*. This oversight led to an unjust cost decision, ignoring crucial evidence that could have influenced the tribunal's view on the reasonableness of our defence.
Supporting Evidence
*. ICO's confirmation of the data breach (attached).
*. Correspondence and documentation related to the data breach (attached).
*. Evidence of the remedied breach of covenant (attached).
*. Documentation of the protest and the nature of the assembly (attached).
*. Medical documentation regarding my partner’s Tourette's syndrome (attached).
*. Conclusion:
*. Given the significant legal and factual oversights, human rights violations, disability discrimination, and data protection breaches, I respectfully request permission to appeal.
*. . I am available for any further clarification or documentation that may be required
Certainly! Here's a final review of your draft appeal letter, ensuring it's clear, concise, and focused on the key points:
---
**To: The Lands Chamber**
Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) HMCTS
5th Floor, Rolls Building
Fetter Lane
London, EC4A 1NL
**From:**
Mr. Kevin Dixon and Mr. David Bell
* Admirals Walk
West Cliff Road
Bournemouth
BH2 5HH
**Date:**
* October *
**Re:** Application for Permission to Appeal – First-tier Tribunal Costs Decision
**Introduction:**
- We seek permission to appeal the First-tier Tribunal's costs decision dated * July *.
- Tribunal Case References: CHI/00HN/LSC/*/* and CHI/00HN/LBC/*/*.
**Grounds for Appeal:**
*. **Misinterpretation of Law and Facts:**
- The judge misinterpreted our peaceful protest as an unreasonable defence. This protest responded to the landlord's continuous failure to address our concerns and respond to our correspondence, including communications with the Information Commissioner's Office (ICO).
- The decision overlooks the landlord's failure to
---
**To: The Lands Chamber**
Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) HMCTS
5th Floor, Rolls Building
Fetter Lane
London, EC4A 1NL
**From:**
Mr. Kevin Dixon and Mr. David Bell
* Admirals Walk
West Cliff Road
Bournemouth
BH2 5HH
**Date:**
* October *
**Re:** Application for Permission to Appeal – First-tier Tribunal Costs Decision
**Introduction:**
- We seek permission to appeal the First-tier Tribunal's costs decision dated * July *.
- Tribunal Case References: CHI/00HN/LSC/*/* and CHI/00HN/LBC/*/*.
**Grounds for Appeal:**
*. **Misinterpretation of Law and Facts:**
- The judge misinterpreted our peaceful protest as an unreasonable defence. This protest responded to the landlord's continuous failure to address our concerns and respond to our correspondence, including communications with the Information Commissioner's Office (ICO).
- The decision overlooks the landlord's failure to