Attorney General Representation Rules

The Pennsylvania Constitution, in concert with the U.S. Constitution, unequivocally establishes that only the Attorney General is vested with the authority to represent the interests of the Commonwealth in legal matters concerning constitutional rights. This foundational structure aAirms the Attorney General’s exclusive role as chief legal oAicer for the Commonwealth, as set forth in Article IV, Section *.* of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Without documented authorization from the Attorney General, the current counsel acting on behalf of Magistrate Richard G. Opiela is in violation of the constitutional chain of command, warranting immediate disqualification. The Constitutional Chain of Command To emphasize the supremacy of constitutional law, it is crucial to recognize the order of authority mandated by Article VI, Section * of the U.S. Constitution, known as the Supremacy Clause, which elevates constitutional provisions above any conflicting statutes or local ordinances. Pennsylvania’s own constitution mirrors this priority through its Preamble and Article I, Section *, underscoring that no legislative or procedural rules can infringe upon the constitutional rights or governance structures established within its framework. By bypassing these mandates, Richard G. Opiela demonstrates a profound disregard for constitutional order, revealing a lack of understanding regarding the “supreme law of the land” and the established chain of command that places the U.S. and state constitutions above any statutory enactment. It is this hierarchy that invalidates the current representation by counsel unaAiliated with the Attorney General’s OAice. Specific Constitutional Provisions Mandating Disqualification *. Article IV, Section *.* of the Pennsylvania Constitution: The Attorney General’s role as chief law oAicer is exclusive and non-transferable. Only with express delegation can another counsel act on behalf of the Commonwealth in cases implicating constitutional protections. Without documented approval, any participation from AOPC-appointed counsel undermines the constitutional hierarchy, voiding their authority and requiring their disqualification. *. Article I, Section * of the Pennsylvania Constitution: Known as the “Due Course of Law” provision, this section protects every citizen’s right to a lawful and authorized judicial process. Unauthorized representation by counsel in this case denies the right to due process and contradicts constitutional guarantees, making the continuation of such representation an infringement on constitutional rights. *. Article VI, Section * (Oath of OAice): Magistrates, like all Pennsylvania judicial oAicers, swear an oath to “support, obey and defend” both the U.S. and Pennsylvania Constitutions. By not grasping the constitutional requirement for the Attorney General’s express authorization, Magistrate Opiela not only risks a breach of not fully understanding his oath of oAice, but further underscores a disregard for the lawful framework that his role demand on an everyday basis. Thus this gentleman Is risking the lives of many who ever stepped foot in his court room with blatant ignorance and comprehension of the law. *. Relevant Case Law Reinforcing Attorney General Authorization In Commonwealth v. Carsia, * A.2d * (Pa. *), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that only the Attorney General or their authorized designee could bring certain actions on behalf of the Commonwealth. Similarly, in Synthes USA HQ, Inc. v. Commonwealth, * Pa. Commw. LEXIS *. In Synthes USA HQ, Inc. v. Commonwealth, * Pa. Commw. LEXIS *, the role of the Pennsylvania Attorney General’s OAice is critical to understanding its authority in representing state agencies, particularly in legal disputes involving the Commonwealth. This case illustrates that the Attorney General's oAice is typically responsible for defending state agencies, such as the Department of Revenue, when they are challenged in court. The Attorney General acts as the chief legal oAicer for the Commonwealth, ensuring that state interests are adequately represented and protected in various legal matters. In disputes involving the Commonwealth, the Attorney General's oAice must be involved, even if their participation isn't the central focus of the case. Their implicit role signifies that any legal challenge against a state agency necessitates the representation of the Attorney General to provide the necessary defense framework. The Attorney General's authority extends to protecting the actions of state entities, thus reinforcing the constitutional requirement that only they—or their expressly authorized representatives—can undertake legal representation for the state in such matters. This distinction is crucial when considering the role of the Administrative OAice of Pennsylvania Courts (AOPC) in the legal representation landscape. The AOPC, while integral to the operation of the judicial system, does not possess the legal authority to represent the Commonwealth or its agencies in court. The AOPC's function is primarily administrative, handling the logistics and support of judicial proceedings rather than engaging in legal representation. Considering this, the reliance on AOPC's representation is unfounded. The absence of Attorney General authorization undermines any claims of legitimacy regarding AOPC's involvement as a defense counsel for state agencies. As per established legal principles, the Attorney General’s role is indispensable in ensuring that the defense of state actions is constitutionally sound and legally valid. Therefore, the argument stands that the AOPC's involvement as a reliable defense in this case is clearly debunked, reinforcing the necessity for Attorney General representation in all matters pertaining to the Commonwealth. The principles articulated in these rulings make it clear that without explicit authorization, any counsel currently acting in this matter lacks standing to represent the Commonwealth. Consequently, their continued representation contradicts both state law and the fundamental protections guaranteed by the Constitution. Conclusion The constitutional framework governing this matter is unequivocal: the U.S. and Pennsylvania Constitutions, supported by applicable case law, require express authorization from the Attorney General for legal representation in cases involving state interests and constitutional rights. The present counsel’s lack of such authorization constitutes a fundamental breach of constitutional protocol, demanding immediate disqualification. Magistrate Richard G. Opiela’s reliance on statutory interpretations without comprehension of the constitutional hierarchy only underscores the improper basis of this representation. Statutory provisions do not override constitutional mandates, and as such, the absence of Attorney General authorization voids any standing of counsel in this case. Therefore, I respectfully urge the court to enforce the constitutional structure and grant my motion to disqualify counsel, upholding the primacy of constitutional law as outlined by the Pennsylvania and U.S. Constitutions.

The Pennsylvania Constitution, in concert with the U.S. Constitution, unequivocally establishes that only the Attorney General is vested with the authority to represent the interests of the Commonwealth in legal matters concerning constitutional rights. This foundational structure aAirms the Attorney General’s exclusive role as chief legal oAicer for the Commonwealth, as set forth in Article IV, Section *.* of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Without documented authorization from the Attorney General, the current counsel acting on behalf of Magistrate Richard G. Opiela is in violation of the constitutional chain of command, warranting immediate disqualification. The Constitutional Chain of Command To emphasize the supremacy of constitutional law, it is crucial to recognize the order of authority mandated by Article VI, Section * of the U.S. Constitution, known as the Supremacy Clause, which elevates constitutional provisions above any conflicting statutes or local ordinances. Pennsylvania’s own constitution mirrors this priority through its Preamble and Article I, Section *, underscoring that no legislative or procedural rules can infringe upon the constitutional rights or governance structures established within its framework. By bypassing these mandates, Richard G. Opiela demonstrates a profound disregard for constitutional order, revealing a lack of understanding regarding the “supreme law of the land” and the established chain of command that places the U.S. and state constitutions above any statutory enactment. It is this hierarchy that invalidates the current representation by counsel unaAiliated with the Attorney General’s OAice. Specific Constitutional Provisions Mandating Disqualification *. Article IV, Section *.* of the Pennsylvania Constitution: The Attorney General’s role as chief law oAicer is exclusive and non-transferable. Only with express delegation can another counsel act on behalf of the Commonwealth in cases implicating constitutional protections. Without documented approval, any participation from AOPC-appointed counsel undermines the constitutional hierarchy, voiding their authority and requiring their disqualification. *. Article I, Section * of the Pennsylvania Constitution: Known as the “Due Course of Law” provision, this section protects every citizen’s right to a lawful and authorized judicial process. Unauthorized representation by counsel in this case denies the right to due process and contradicts constitutional guarantees, making the continuation of such representation an infringement on constitutional rights. *. Article VI, Section * (Oath of OAice): Magistrates, like all Pennsylvania judicial oAicers, swear an oath to “support, obey and defend” both the U.S. and Pennsylvania Constitutions. By not grasping the constitutional requirement for the Attorney General’s express authorization, Magistrate Opiela not only risks a breach of not fully understanding his oath of oAice, but further underscores a disregard for the lawful framework that his role demand on an everyday basis. Thus this gentleman Is risking the lives of many who ever stepped foot in his court room with blatant ignorance and comprehension of the law. *. Relevant Case Law Reinforcing Attorney General Authorization In Commonwealth v. Carsia, * A.2d * (Pa. *), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that only the Attorney General or their authorized designee could bring certain actions on behalf of the Commonwealth. Similarly, in Synthes USA HQ, Inc. v. Commonwealth, * Pa. Commw. LEXIS *. In Synthes USA HQ, Inc. v. Commonwealth, * Pa. Commw. LEXIS *, the role of the Pennsylvania Attorney General’s OAice is critical to understanding its authority in representing state agencies, particularly in legal disputes involving the Commonwealth. This case illustrates that the Attorney General's oAice is typically responsible for defending state agencies, such as the Department of Revenue, when they are challenged in court. The Attorney General acts as the chief legal oAicer for the Commonwealth, ensuring that state interests are adequately represented and protected in various legal matters. In disputes involving the Commonwealth, the Attorney General's oAice must be involved, even if their participation isn't the central focus of the case. Their implicit role signifies that any legal challenge against a state agency necessitates the representation of the Attorney General to provide the necessary defense framework. The Attorney General's authority extends to protecting the actions of state entities, thus reinforcing the constitutional requirement that only they—or their expressly authorized representatives—can undertake legal representation for the state in such matters. This distinction is crucial when considering the role of the Administrative OAice of Pennsylvania Courts (AOPC) in the legal representation landscape. The AOPC, while integral to the operation of the judicial system, does not possess the legal authority to represent the Commonwealth or its agencies in court. The AOPC's function is primarily administrative, handling the logistics and support of judicial proceedings rather than engaging in legal representation. Considering this, the reliance on AOPC's representation is unfounded. The absence of Attorney General authorization undermines any claims of legitimacy regarding AOPC's involvement as a defense counsel for state agencies. As per established legal principles, the Attorney General’s role is indispensable in ensuring that the defense of state actions is constitutionally sound and legally valid. Therefore, the argument stands that the AOPC's involvement as a reliable defense in this case is clearly debunked, reinforcing the necessity for Attorney General representation in all matters pertaining to the Commonwealth. The principles articulated in these rulings make it clear that without explicit authorization, any counsel currently acting in this matter lacks standing to represent the Commonwealth. Consequently, their continued representation contradicts both state law and the fundamental protections guaranteed by the Constitution. Conclusion The constitutional framework governing this matter is unequivocal: the U.S. and Pennsylvania Constitutions, supported by applicable case law, require express authorization from the Attorney General for legal representation in cases involving state interests and constitutional rights. The present counsel’s lack of such authorization constitutes a fundamental breach of constitutional protocol, demanding immediate disqualification. Magistrate Richard G. Opiela’s reliance on statutory interpretations without comprehension of the constitutional hierarchy only underscores the improper basis of this representation. Statutory provisions do not override constitutional mandates, and as such, the absence of Attorney General authorization voids any standing of counsel in this case. Therefore, I respectfully urge the court to enforce the constitutional structure and grant my motion to disqualify counsel, upholding the primacy of constitutional law as outlined by the Pennsylvania and U.S. Constitutions.

No I need just clarify this was correct because the judge dismissed the motion

I filled out another one because the only reason she dismissed it was *) BIAS *) IT WOULD HAVE AUTOMATICALLY BEEN A DISQUALIFY AND DEFAULT JUDGEMENT

No I need more help with something else

I need to make the Donavan vs Rodriguez case and the laws, statutes, codes that are for governement cited quote which means that even if they use that for a defense after I made a Notice of Discovery and Supplement the Notice of Discovery that cannot use those codes, laws or statutues in their defense correct